

Party Politics, Constituency Organization, and the Power of the Electoral Register: National Perspectives and The Bristol Battleground 1832–1841

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Political rancour is indeed the bane of the city, and it follows her merchants and her tradesmen not only to the hustings and the polling-booth, but into the house of God itself – to the abodes of charity – to the neutral ground of literature and science – and even to the places of trade and barter. . . . it is difficult to conceive what connection an institution established to administer to the sick body, and another to furnish food to the healthy mind can have with the Corn Laws or a Reform in Parliament; and yet is there a committee to be appointed, the advocates of either side struggle for a majority, and success is a matter of most serious congratulation.

(Bristol Mercury, 17 November 1832)

Bristol in the 1830s exhibited a high degree of political antagonism and polarization; the local press, the corporation before and after 1835, local societies, and charities all showed a strong tendency to divide along party lines. Indeed, as in many towns, political conflict provided an almost theatrical backdrop of propaganda and display for the local inhabitants. Tory election candidates canvassed to an accompaniment consisting of the ringing of church bells and the hanging of blue flags from church towers. Moreover, political disagreement could emerge in some unusual places. A liberal-inclined newspaper correspondent in September 1834 complained of how the proceedings of a Bristol Horticultural Dinner were hijacked by ultra-Tories with toasts to 'Church and King', and argued that having allowed 'The Bishop and clergy of the Diocese', the 'Dissenting Ministers of Bristol' ought to have followed. He had little anticipated that, 'an occasion so totally disconnected from politics would ever be made the stalking horse to serve a party purpose'.¹

Several historians have explored Bristol's lively but complex local politics in the early nineteenth century.² Most recently John Phillips, through an analysis of Bristol's pollbooks, has emphasized the extent to which Bristol's electorate was already politicized by 1832 and the efficiency and effectiveness of the Tory electoral organization in the city. He argued that party feeling accelerated after 1832, citing the increasing proportion of the electorate 'plumping' for political reasons in the 1837 and 1841 Bristol elections – in other words using only one of their two votes to support the Liberal candidate F.H.F. Berkeley. Phillips concluded that Reform and the Abolition of Slavery, 'reduced a tripartite, idiosyncratic party system to a bipartisan nationally oriented system in a relatively short time. Bristol's existing party structure greatly facilitated the transition, but the debate over Reform and the alterations occasioned by Reform were the twin catalysts that effected the change.'³

Phillips' psephological analysis has significantly improved our understanding of voting patterns in Bristol but his work still provides an incomplete picture. This paper will argue that an additional and important catalyst of the increased political partisanship in Bristol in the 1830s, which deserves more emphasis than it has been accorded, was the improvement in Liberal party organization. The electioneering manoeuvring of Liberals in Bristol coincided with, although by no means passively reflected, the wider desire amongst some national Whig-Liberal activists to create a more efficient party machine. The article begins, therefore, by exploring national organizational initiatives before relating them to events in Bristol. Subsequently it is argued that a full appreciation of the course of political conflict in Bristol needs to take more account of the peculiarly local factors which often played an important part in shaping political allegiances in the town.

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At a national level aristocratic whigs were reluctant to use their large financial resources to sponsor extra-parliamentary organization. This sprang from a fear of populism, an instinctive belief in the respectability of parliamentary preoccupations, and a belief in the freedom of parliament to act independently. Such a position was intellectually consistent with what is widely accepted as the whigs' conservative and concessionary motives for passing the 1832 Reform Act – a desire to keep decisions in the hands of 'those who were most fit to govern the affairs of the country'.⁴ Nevertheless, there were attempts made by whig and radical enthusiasts at a national level to co-ordinate registration activities and this account, based primarily upon

the private correspondence of Joseph Parkes, Edward Ellice, and Lord Durham, will outline their aims, successes and problems in stimulating local efforts from London.

Lord Durham recognized the need, in general terms, in November 1834 for 'the formation and organization of associations in every town and village of the Empire' and his experience during the campaign before the General Election of January 1835 strongly reinforced this opinion. He wrote to Joseph Parkes,

Truly the result of this election must convince every Reformer of the necessity of having an association or club in London, to counteract the machinations of the Tory Carlton Club Is there any chance of effecting it? . . . I would come up to town directly and devote my whole time to effecting it.⁵

An early dissolution of parliament was possible and there was a need for a central committee where Reform candidates could apply for assistance and advice. He further believed that 'a third of the actual strength is not on the Register owing to negligence and Whiggism'.⁶ Durham liked to see himself as the founding father and mentor of the Registration Association which was formally established in London on 31 May 1835, but tended to offer distant strategic advice. In a practical sense he was most influential in organizing northern constituencies within his purview by establishing District registration committees with a general central committee. In November 1835, soon after his arrival at the embassy in Russia, he had written solicitously to Parkes:

Do not let the association get weakly or omit to superintend its education. It is, as you justly say, *my child* and I entertain towards it the feelings of a parent. If its organization is made as complete as I intended it, it would be the most powerful engine for defence, as well as offence, that any party ever possessed.⁷

Edward Ellice, a shrewd political insider and whig party manager, had come to the same conclusion as Durham on the need for improved party organization. His own first-hand knowledge of the workings of the electoral system had been honed as Secretary to the Treasury, chief whip, and election co-ordinator between November 1830 and August 1832. In an electoral system which was primarily local in nature rather than national, it was what was actually happening on the ground that mattered, and the Whigs had insufficient information on this basic question. The 1835 election had been fought, as usual, on an 'ad hoc' basis. In December 1834 Poulett Thompson could write to Lord

Howick that only Mulgrave, Duncannon and himself were left in London to do everything about the forthcoming elections. With the aid of Hobhouse these three prepared lists at 3 Cleveland Square (Ellice's house), assisted in the selection of candidates, and helped to distribute the whigs' limited financial resources.⁸ Ellice regarded himself as the originator of the Reform Association and later showed considerable pique that his thunder was being stolen by Durham and to a lesser extent Parkes; 'neither he, you [Parkes] or the people of whom you speak, had anything to do with or knew anything of the R[eform] A[ssociation] till I called you into council for assistance in getting it up', and in December 1835 he referred to Durham's 'enormous bump of amour propre'.⁹ From April 1833 until December 1834 Ellice had served as Secretary of War with a seat in the cabinet, but after 1835 he never held formal office. He continued, however, to be an influential adviser to liberal governments behind the scenes right up to his death in 1863, and he managed the 1841 election for the whigs, including the distribution of party funds.¹⁰

The hard-working Joseph Parkes was as fluent as Durham on the subject of his own influence, commenting in 1834 that 'no "commoner" has such local connections as I have, in the way of agitation. I know all the "pull strings",' and claiming in July 1835 'a wider insight into and connection with the Liberal party of the country than any man living'.¹¹ Whilst these comments betrayed more than a degree of 'hubris', Parkes had indeed built up important contacts with influential provincial liberal leaders through his work as a solicitor and election agent in and around Birmingham, Coventry, Warwick, and the Midland counties, and after 1833 as Secretary to the Commission on Municipal Corporations. His home in Westminster was much used as a meeting place for whig and radical M.P.s.¹² He became enormously frustrated with the Whig government during the course of the 1830s, and their unwillingness to show sympathy for the 'requirements of the *constituency* created by the Reform acts'. As regards the management of the press, which was another criterion of whig organization and commitment to enlisting the support of opinion out-of-doors, Parkes regarded the government as 'great fools It has not been cultivated while the Tories have a regular artillery in the field.'¹³ Part of the problem was that Parkes was emphatically no whig himself, describing them to Francis Place in 1836 as 'an unnatural party standing between the People and the Tory aristocracy chiefly for the pecuniary value of offices and vanity of power. Their hearse is ordered.'¹⁴ Parkes was something of an intermediary between whigs and radicals (he had made his name as an effective mediator between the government and the Birmingham Political

Union in 1831–2) and this proved a barrier to the Registration Association receiving the full trust and co-operation of the whig leadership. Party organization was equated with radicalism, as Lord Melbourne spelled out in 1836:

I have not taken much cognisance of what is going on at Cleveland Row, despairing of being able to manage or control. The fact is that these matters are in the hands of those who, from the commencement of the late administration, pursued the system which led to its downfall.¹⁵

Melbourne never made any equivalent appeal to Sir Robert Peel's famous 'Register, Register, Register' speech. As early as 1833, Parkes's frustration at whig inactivity led him to write that 'I find no relief but in a violent fit of swearing when I am alone'. His tone was not markedly different by September 1841, when he concluded a letter to E.J. Stanley, the patronage secretary to the treasury from 1835–1841 and the whigs' chief whip; 'unless some organization is made by the whigs, I will no longer waste my time working on their behalf'.¹⁶ Parkes was equally prone, however, to excited exaggeration of the potential of political changes, and for a time, between 1835 and 1837 his hopes had risen markedly and the sense of disillusionment lifted. He had witnessed for himself in January 1835 during a contested election in North Warwickshire, which had been lost 'by our own neglect of registration and pre-arrangement', some of the problems which existed on the ground. Overall in the 1835 election many candidates were away from home at the time of the dissolution so that at least 20 seats had been lost through a lack of candidates, and Parkes later complained that 'almost all the leading men were looking to themselves. . . . In my whole life I never was or can be so disgusted'.¹⁷ He thus responded eagerly to the challenge of setting in motion and organizing a central Registration organization.¹⁸

In its first months the Registration Association helped to stimulate a fair degree of success. Several dozen local associations were formed, the lines of communication between various Whig/Liberal organizations improved, and a similar association was established in Ireland in October 1835. James Coppock was appointed as a full-time secretary, with a salary of £300, and a residence in the society's rooms at Cleveland Row, which became a rendezvous of agents and solicitors from all parts of the country and a centre for party intelligence.¹⁹ When all the information and returns were collected, following the registration of 1835, Parkes reported to E.J. Stanley that the results were 'highly favourable', commenting that:

The Town constituencies have been thoroughly sifted by the Reformers, and especially a great *weeding* of the non-Resident Freemen who crowded many of the Registers of 1833 and 1834 for want of attention But what strikes me most in the country and amounts to a distinct gain, is the organization and union of Reformers produced by this year's attention to the Register. All this result, besides additional numbers will, with Municipal Revolution, tell vastly at the next contest.

The *Edinburgh Review* concurred, and complimented the associations 'upon a large and decisive addition to the ranks of the liberal voters throughout the three kingdoms'.²⁰ Parkes spelled out in great detail to Lord Durham, the gains he expected in the Liberal cause as a result of the battles in the Registration courts. In some counties there had been a 20–30% increase – North Warwickshire, South Lancashire, North Nottinghamshire, the West and East Ridings of Yorkshire, and South Staffordshire – and sixteen other English counties were named where the whigs had 'gained great strength'. There were six 'certain' gains in Scottish burghs and 'in the English boroughs and cities our Liberal registration organization has been perfect and eminently successful The increase of little buildings and houses has favoured us Tories slipped in by the Town Clerks have been knocked off the perch by our objectors.' He named Bristol as one of fourteen towns where 'we shall gain seats more or less by the Registration', and many close victories in the election of 1835 were regarded as having been so secured.²¹

Parkes's optimism was fuelled by his expectation of the effects of municipal reform upon parliamentary constituencies. Many at Bristol, and in other corporate towns would have shared his view, that 'Municipal Reform is the steam engine for the Mill built by "Parliamentary Reform"'. The one comparatively the shadow, the other the substance'.²² The sweeping Liberal victories of November 1835 in the reformed municipalities exceeded even his expectations. He wrote jubilantly to Durham, in January 1836, 'Only think of Leicester, Liverpool, Coventry, Cambridge, York etc., etc., in our hands. Nothing surpasses the rout tell of Emperor of all the Russians but the conflagration of Moscow.' Thirty-six once Tory, now Liberal corporations, were represented in parliament by one Tory MP; seventeen once Tory, now Liberal corporations were represented in parliament by two Tory MPs. Parkes thus anticipated picking up 70 seats through the dent which had been inflicted upon Tory local patronage. Six months later he was a little more cautiously optimistic, forecasting that two-thirds of county seats were safe, the whigs would lose about 20, but gain 30–45 seats from municipal reform – 'our great want is of opulent Landed Proprietors to find funds for Registration and contests'.²³

In October 1836 Parkes contrasted the Whig/Liberals' unpreparedness in December 1834 with their readiness for any impending contest:

*Now, with decent forecast, we have most superior means of planting the cause, the Reform Associations in town and country, the Town councils, the Club; Many of us extensively in communication with the leading liberals of the country.*²⁴

In fact, despite the accession of a sympathetic Victoria, which it was thought would assist the government, the Whig/Liberals failed to improve their overall position in the boroughs and were beaten heavily in the counties in 1837. Parkes later estimated that the Whigs had *lost* about 20 seats in corporate towns, mainly freemen boroughs, after he under-estimated the extent to which they continued to be 'auction marts of electoral corruption'.²⁵ Various reasons have been assigned for this defeat but organizational efforts had been clearly shown to be insufficient. Lord John Russell, for example, expressed himself unsurprised by the outcome of the English county elections, commenting to Lord Howick that 'The thing is managed by the Tories spending much money and trouble on the registration.'²⁶ Yet Russell himself was relatively indifferent to party management, and took no pains to cultivate the goodwill of those on whom he depended for support. Sir Robert Heron, made a similar point: 'We have been routed more than could have been anticipated by either party. Church in danger, has done something, but bribery, the £50 voters, and our neglect of the registers have done more.'²⁷ What is certain is that after 1837 Liberals at party headquarters and in the provinces tended to be pessimistic as to future electoral prospects.²⁸ There was disappointment that they had failed to stem the electoral tide towards the Conservatives, and registration efforts slackened. This slackening, of course, coincided with economic recession, growing unemployment, rising dislike of the effects of the New Poor Law, Chartist discontent, boredom with the government's preoccupation over Irish affairs, uncertainty about what the Whig cabinet was going to do with regard to corn and other duties, and regular ministerial reshuffles. At the same time, Conservatives effectively grasped the potentiality of registration politics in the three registrations of 1838–1840. It was indicative of the suspicion in which the Reform Association was held that, when an Election Fund Subscription was mooted following the 1837 defeat, many whigs objected 'to the nucleus being the Reform Association and even to the meeting being dated there', and in order to distance the Association from the subscription it was decided that Coppock's name

should not appear among the originators.²⁹ In 1839, when the Association was wound up, Coppock was refused a minor government sinecure because his role at the Association might have brought embarrassment upon the Whigs.³⁰ The Reform Association had for a time collated precious information, but it was neither equipped nor designed to study each constituency in real depth. In any case information was of little use if not acted upon. Parkes gave his prediction to Russell in 1841 of the electoral position, but this was effectively an intelligent guess.³¹ The Whigs entered the 1841 General Election once more upon a largely 'ad hoc' basis.

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It is the interplay between national and local themes which will serve as the focus of the rest of the article. The national complacency of the whigs as regards organization was mirrored at Bristol in the period of just over two years between the 1832 and 1835 General Elections. Reformers managed to get themselves into a muddle at the 1832 General Election, which resulted in the election of the ultra-Tory, Sir Richard Vyvyan and the moderate 'Old Whig' J.E. Baillie. The two genuine reformers were rejected. Whig-Liberals at Bristol received an even greater shock at the General Election of 1835 which saw two Tories returned to Westminster – P.J. Miles and Vyvyan – and it was this defeat which stung them into renewed activity and organization. The Bristol Liberal Association was established in March 1835 and it worked tirelessly in the following three years, achieving a number of successes at both municipal and parliamentary levels. F.H.F. Berkeley, an advanced Liberal, who advocated the ballot and repeal of the Corn Laws, was elected at the General Election of July 1837. He retained his seat in 1841, but by then Liberal organization and morale had once more fallen into disarray.³² This account of the activities of Bristol reformers in the 1830s thus falls into three distinct phases: decline 1832–1835, revival and successes 1835–1838, and renewed slump 1838–1841.

Organization became increasingly important at local level in the 1830s. The Bristol Tories had a formidable electioneering machine upon which they could call even in the 1810s and 1820s, but they also realized more quickly the opportunities presented by some of the detailed provisions of the 1832 Reform Act, and built upon their existing strengths. The area of the parliamentary borough of Bristol was extended in 1832 from one to two miles square and the same boundaries were also adopted as municipal borders in 1835.³³ Within these boundaries the parish continued to be the key unit from a political

point of view. Bristol consisted of eighteen parishes, each of which possessed generous charitable endowments, managed by churchwardens, and a small Select Vestry consisting of ten or twelve people. Reformers bemoaned the continuing power of these vestries. They did not admit fellow parishioners to be present at their meetings, refused to allow the inspection of their account books, and made surcharges of rates upon some individuals in order to make up for defaulters who were in general Tory supporters, all those surcharged being religious dissenters. The practical result of this lack of accountability was that the funds were applied, according to the Liberal W.P. Taunton writing despairingly to Lord Brougham, 'to promote the corrupt electioneering purposes of the Tory party; and every select vestry is a regular organized standing Tory committee for the purposes of parliamentary and municipal elections'. Another prominent Bristol Liberal, Harman Visger gave evidence to the Select Committee on Bribery in 1835 that he had seen the books himself in which electioneering proceedings were recorded in Vestry minutes.³⁴

The strength of the Tory organization which reformers were up against, and their problems between 1832 and 1835 as perceived by sage political adversaries, can be assessed through the surviving private papers of Sir Richard Vyvyan. Vyvyan's agents maintained a well-informed watching brief on the activities of the Liberals. In the aftermath of the election of December 1832 the Reform Committee remained in existence and sought to mount a legal challenge to Vyvyan's victory, on the grounds of bribery and treating. But a lack of finance was a major hindrance; Bristol reformers lacked wealthy supporters and they had already contributed a great deal to Edward Protheroe's unsuccessful campaign. A fund of £2,000 to cover their legal costs was raised by a public subscription in the parishes, after impassioned appeals in the local press, but it seems likely that this needed to be topped up by some of the more prosperous supporters of reform.³⁵ With the failure of the petition in April 1833, because of the perennial difficulty of proving agency before a committee of MPs, the Reform Committee quickly folded. It had hardly been a particularly effective organization since its establishment in April 1831; its membership of 'respectable' reformers – merchants, bankers, and businessmen, who saw themselves as a counterweight to the Bristol Political Union – had contented themselves with giving order and regularity to public meetings connected with reform, and T.J. Manchee, a former editor of the liberal *Bristol Mercury* had described them dismissively as 'a body that can scarcely be said to exist'.³⁶ Nevertheless Whig-Liberals now lacked any kind of institutional unity, and effectively retired from the fray; Henry Bush reported that 'the

very heavy expense of the petition has completely disorganized the enemy for the present'. Lack of money proved to be a continuing problem for reformers. For example, in the lead-up to the 1835 election campaign, Bush noted that the monied part of Protheroe's election committee had suffered from the collapse of the Brazilian Mining Company on the stock exchange, and would not find it convenient to subscribe any large sum. And even in August 1836, by which time the Liberals were infinitely better organized, Bush could again note that they were very low in their funds and that the death and illness of two key subscribers had deprived them of £1,000.³⁷

Bristol Tories were quicker to realize the potential advantage to be gained from the new system of registration than their Whig-Liberal counterparts,³⁸ On the first two Sundays in August, lists of householders and freeholders were attached to church doors, whilst lists of freemen were placed in the Guildhall. The lists lay with churchwardens and the Town Clerk for claims and objections to be made before they were passed on to revising barristers who assessed disputed claims in court. There was much scope for tactical manipulation of this process. Voters could be excluded from the lists on technicalities relating to their payment of taxes or poor-rates. Tax collectors could deliberately neglect to call until after the limit of payment for the purposes of registration had expired, they could neglect to charge ratepayers the necessary registration shilling, or exclude the shilling sign deliberately from tax receipts. Alternatively, spurious objections could be made in the hope that individuals would not turn up at court to defend themselves, for which of course they would have had to leave their workplace.³⁹ In 1833 Bush reported that in 'the *Radical* parishes' nearly 400 people who had voted for Protheroe the previous year were not on the Register and that there had been no whig objections at the revision. In 1834 he again noted that the registration had been favourable to the Tories and added that a considerable number of small householders who had voted for Protheroe had omitted to register, whilst the Conservatives remained in full force.⁴⁰ Whig-Liberals at Bristol thus lost out quite badly on the registrations of 1833 and 1834. A member of the Select Committee on Bribery in 1835 asked Visger directly,

Q. Is the Independent or Liberal Party not anxious enough for reform, for the object of securing a Member of their own, that they will make no exertions on the occasion of the annual registry?

A. There are a number of considerations as to that; they are rather inimicable as to curtailing the franchise for one thing; another thing is,

that it is the most formidable undertaking that you could imagine, with a constituency like Bristol, where perhaps not more than one third are really to be found in the places for which they are registered.⁴¹

This was a weak answer since the first of his reasons was hardly valid given that the 1833 petition against Vyvyan's return had called for the disfranchisement of patently corrupt freemen, and the second reason was a tacit admission of organizational inadequacy.

In their own political analysis, published after the 1835 election in a pamphlet entitled *Causes and Consequences of the Return of Two Tories to Represent the City of Bristol in Parliament*, reformers cast the blame for their problems and failures far and wide. Predictably, they emphasized that the whole electoral system as it operated in Bristol was unfair and argued that the election of two Tories in no way reflected opinion in the city. In addition to the activities of the Select Vestries, manipulation of the registration, and political manipulation of charitable funds, they pointed to the willingness of freemen to sell themselves to the highest bidder, widespread drunkenness and bribery (which amounted to an annual value of £15–20,000) and countless iniquities carried out on behalf of the 'Conservative Operative Society' such as the notorious distribution of 'Blue Beef' at Christmas. Most of these complaints were perfectly valid and were subsequently backed by detailed and eye-witness evidence before the Select Committee on Bribery. The Operatives' Society had come into being after the riots in October 1831, and claimed that its chief purpose was charitable; money collected through subscriptions went to relieve the wives of freemen during their confinement or provided sickness benefit. In fact, Bush's letters confirm that they were a directly political organization. He noted in 1833, for example, that 'The Operative Club is being remembered and I am glad to say there are very few members out of work.'⁴² The pamphlet also directed a great deal of bitterness and blame towards 'Old Whig' families who were a block upon progress and a hindrance to the reform cause:

The existing representatives of the old Whiggery of Bristol are some half dozen wealthy families – too indolent to engage deeply in the bustle of politics – too proud to relinquish tamely their one member, and suffered by Tory cupidity to have their wishes, lest they . . . [are] . . . provoked into throwing the prestige of their names and the important consideration of their wealth into the 'Radical' scale.

However, it was all very well, for reformers to complain, but they had done very little in the previous two years to guard against such

tactics which had been a fact of life in Bristol politics for the previous twenty-five years, albeit with more refined methods after 1832. The pamphleteer admitted that reformers required much better organization; 'we must look to the registration – parochial committees and a general committee, all busy in watching the registry'.⁴³

The early 1830s can be seen as the period when the split between 'Old Whigs' and progressive reformers in Bristol, which had existed from at least 1812, became explicit and irrevocable. The rank and file activists at Bristol are henceforth more accurately defined as Liberals rather than Whigs although considerable terminological inexactitude remained. Harman Visger commented in evidence before the Select Committee in 1835 that a third party had emerged at Bristol, 'as contradistinguished from whig and tory', although he seemed to be unclear whether it should be referred to as the 'Liberal' or the 'Reform' party. Elsewhere this third party was defined as 'the party of the people – the party composed of whigs in practice as well as the principle'. The *Bristol Mercury* in the heat of an election battle, made a blunt threefold distinction between the Tory, West-Indian, and Liberal parties.⁴⁴ A series of six 'Letters to Whigs on Whiggery', published in the *Mercury* in December 1832 and January 1833, spelled out the differences in outlook between 'Old Whigs' and 'Liberal Whigs'. Arthur Palmer had defended his support for Baillie on the grounds that he was a whig of 1688, 'not a modern wild whig, with an un-English tri-coloured flag before him', he believed in 'rational and constitutional reform'. The reply came that the tri-colour was a badge of French freedom and an object of symbolic and legitimate interest to any whig; the argument was essentially about the right of people to amend the constitution when it had fallen into disrepair. 'Modern whigs' were not wild; they opposed all monopolies and slavery, and were in favour of church reform, relief for dissenters, improved education, shorter parliaments, and extended suffrage and the ballot. The 'Old Whigs' of Bristol had effectively coalesced with the Tories in order to support their own self-interest in maintaining the West Indian monopoly and West Indian slavery.⁴⁵ Over the next three years many of these 'Old Whigs' either drifted out of politics or joined the Tory party; for example, four of the Tory councillors in the first municipal corporation were former Whigs.⁴⁶ The absence of several prominent individuals from the dinner given to Lord John Russell in Bristol in November 1835 allowed the Tory press to pour scorn upon the meeting – 'our leading whigs gave no sanction to the proceedings'. A Tory satirist had the following vision:

A voice whispered into my ear that Russell was surrounded by the most *wealthy* and *influential* men of Bristol. I looked around for such as I

understood enjoy that reputation – for the Daniels, the Milites, the Acramans, Savages, Cunninghams, Bushes, Barnards, Paynes, Brights, Ames, Baillies, Harfords, and inquired, ‘Where are they?’⁴⁷

Several of the above were never Whigs and could not have been expected to have attended such a dinner, but it is nevertheless fair to say that half a dozen of the wealthiest Bristol merchant families who had held whig sympathies, disassociated themselves from the Liberal revival of the mid 1830s. In the immediate post-reform years there was certainly a desire among ‘respectable’ citizens to distance themselves from radicalism. As the Bristol scientist William Conybeare confirmed in a letter to a fellow scientist in March 1833, ‘In the last election my old whig party and the Conservatives coalesced against radical unions etc., which I firmly hold we ought to do generally.’ As the *Bristol Mercury* aptly described it, some people withdrew from the political fray or drifted to the right, ‘from a certain indefinable dread that the progress of the movement was too rapid to be safe’.⁴⁸ It was as much a defensive emotional instinct as a specific objection to the policies of the Whig government, or even to the professed principles of Bristol Liberals.

Very soon after the 1835 election a decision was taken in Bristol that a permanent association was required to protect electors in the reform interest in the city, and that there was a need to draw up a set of objectives and rules. In March 1835 the Bristol Liberal Association came into being and published its prospectus. The stress was on registration activities and note was taken of the advantage being gained by the Tory party exploiting loopholes in the system, and the reformers’ lack of organization. Great vigilance was necessary in large towns, ‘especially in those encumbered with a corrupt body of servile freemen’.⁴⁹ Bristol reformers realized this for themselves without having to be nudged into action from above, although discussion of such a new approach was current in the London newspapers. The Association established a permanent set of offices at Albion Chambers in the centre of the city, and was extremely active over the following three years. On more than one occasion it dealt directly with the government or its agents and, for example, helped to provide the information which Harman Visger used as ammunition before the Select Committee on Bribery. It called public meetings, and promoted petitions, and its secretary J.B. Kington wrote to London newspapers, including the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Globe*. Leading members of the Association capitalized upon opportunities to dominate both the Charity Trustees and the magistrates’ Bench; the latter appointments were the responsibility of central government. Several factors came

together in the mid 1830s which contributed to the success of the Bristol Liberal Association. The most important was that its members' dual motivation of seeking changes not only at the level of parliamentary representation, but in the municipal government of Bristol and its notorious abuses. John Ham, a former Vice-President of the Bristol General Union, wrote to Francis Place that the corporation had 'dulled the people into abject servility and the latter have but just awakened to their local slavery'. There was probably also a shift to the left in the opinions of Bristol's rank and file Liberals. One indication of this was that they chose noted radicals such as J.T. Leader and James Roebuck to present petitions in parliament, or to argue their case, whilst they were represented by two Tory M.P.s after 1835 (although Leader and Roebuck did represent West Country constituencies in Bridgewater and Bath respectively). Ham had further commented to Place that 'the Manchees and all the other "trimmers" are however now progressing towards the Ballot and Radicalism', driven by events.⁵⁰

Several factors combined to boost Bristol Liberalism in the mid-1830s. A sympathetic press provided support and publicity. There were renewed exertions and improved organization with regard to registration and to electioneering in general; the dinner given to Lord John Russell in 1835 brought a national seal of approval, municipal politics gave an additional impetus to partisanship, and the Liberal association was actively involved in the selection of Berkeley as a candidate. Two key elements were unity of purpose and leadership. The *Bristol Gazette* could comment in November 1835 that 'for the first time in a number of years the party has become thoroughly united', largely due to the 'unceasing vigilance and activity' of the association.⁵¹ The same key names of Liberal individuals tend to recur on petitions, requisitions, attending dinners, making subscriptions, and delivering speeches. As a group they were perhaps not much larger than 120 individuals, a politicized minority, which formed a large enough vanguard to organize effective campaigns. Within this group, key individuals formed the Association's articulate inner core, men such as James Cunningham, George Sanders, George Thomas, Harman Visger, J.B. Kingston, William Herapath and William Tothill.⁵² These influential and active individuals helped to create, at least temporarily, an effective and well-organized body.

The Association had little difficulty in achieving favourable publicity, and there was no doubting the importance of the press in reflecting and stimulating political activity. The *Bristol Gazette* was to some extent the mouthpiece of the Association; both the editors John Mills, and his son were successively leading officers within the organization. The *Bristol Mercury*, too, was sympathetic, although

W.H. Somerton, its proprietor, was not in the inner councils of the local Liberal party. A briefly successful newspaper, the *Bristol Advocate*, ran for about six months from 17 September 1836 to 11 February 1837, and was edited by J.B. Kington who had earlier worked as a journalist on the *Mercury*. Kington was an expert on the arcane workings and abuses of Bristol's corporation, being the anonymous 'Burgess' who published *Thirty Letters on the Trade of Bristol: The Causes of its decline, and the means of its revival*, in pamphlet form in 1834, the letters having originally appeared in the *Mercury*.⁵³ He concentrated on what he knew best, writing lengthy reports of the proceedings of the Town Council, Bristol's charity trustees, and on the municipal revision of the register. The first issue of the paper sold 2,700 copies and by Christmas 1836 its average circulation was 2,300 copies a week, which made it the fifth most widely circulated provincial newspaper in the country and the most popular in the West of England. According to *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine* at the end of 1836, the success of the *Advocate* was evidence that 'Liberal principles are gaining many converts in Bristol'. The *Advocate* had issued 10,000 copies of its prospectus in July, in which the key message to reformers was 'Look to the Registration', and it boasted that 'as a political organ, it possesses the confidence of a powerful and organised body of politicians',⁵⁴ a reference to the Bristol Liberal Association. The paper folded not because it was an unsuccessful business venture, but through Kington's ill-health.

Despite the fact that Tories both publicly and in private poured scorn upon the gathering, the dinner given by Bristol reformers to Russell in November 1835 was a further significant land-mark in the revival of Liberal fortunes in Bristol. Firstly, it was an enormous coup for the city to persuade Lord John to attend a dinner in his honour in order to receive a candlestick paid for by a public subscription, in admiration 'for the manly integrity and able generalship' he had shown during the passage of the Reform Bill. Russell spoke in public rarely outside the House of Commons. Second, the dinner acted as a kind of catharsis for Bristol Liberals; as the *Mercury* reminded its readers, 'As a body the Bristol reformers have been held up as composed, for the most part, of a mass of reckless adventurers; and more especially has this been the case since the lamentable [Reform Bill] riots in 1831.'⁵⁵ The visit helped to restore self-respect, self-belief, and Bristol's good name among reformers. Naturally the occasion received national coverage, and Bristol could feel that it had received the official imprimatur of approval. The printed address to Russell noted that, 'Union for common objects, and the relinquishment of all Separating Questions will form our Motto, and will be the Motto of all throughout the Kingdom who seek Reform in order to preserve and renovate.'⁵⁶ There

were the usual mixed reactions to the dinner in the press; for the *Bristol Gazette* it was a 'splendid demonstration of feeling', whilst the *Mercury* described proceedings as 'calculated to produce the happiest effects to the liberal cause, not in our own locality merely, but in every county and city of the Empire'. The paper further described the good order which prevailed, the 'elevated and dignified tone of the speeches', and emphasized 'the respectability and wealth of the persons present'. Conversely, for the *Bristol Journal* the dinner was 'one of the most vapid, uninteresting entertainments imaginable', which the elite of respectable Whig reformers had ignored.⁵⁷ Henry Bush in his private reports to Vyvyan had similarly predicted that 'in point of respectability they will cut a sorry figure' and subsequently described the dinner, as 'a sad failure . . . the subscribers are dissatisfied at not being present when the candlestick was presented, the Rads by his coming in a back way and avoiding them, and the Liberal Club thought his speech too Conservative'.⁵⁸ There may well have been some grains of truth in Tory criticisms; even an ally of Russell described the early part of his speech as 'languid and ineffective', and the liberal Bristol press reacted defensively to the Tory list of prominent absentees, by publishing their own compilation of families who did attend; 'the Rickettses, the Castles, the Ashes, the Fripps, the Sanderses, the Bruces, etc., are not altogether unknown or unrespected in this city'. Setting aside party-political interpretations, Russell's visit was a major event for Bristol, which inspired comment and discussion at a time of high political excitement in the city. One gets a taste of this in the reaction of the poet Thomas Moore, who was at Bowood with Russell, on the day in Bristol preceding the dinner:

Could collect from the Bristolians I talked with that nothing could be more bitter and internecine than the state of feeling between the two parties among them at present. No bells were suffered to be rung during this day and one hot churchman had got the bell-ropes of two steeples in his house to prevent the possibility of a single ring for the Rads.

Although there were no bells, in the morning cannons boomed from some of the ships in the harbour. The dinner was attended by nearly 500 people and included Lord Ebrington, Lord Segrave, J.T. Leader, Edward Protheroe, the Hon. Grantley Berkeley, and all the key Bristol Liberals. It was an event that was looked back upon with some awe and affection.⁵⁹

Bristol's municipal politics before and after the local government reform of 1835 have been fully and expertly analyzed elsewhere⁶⁰ and it is only the ramifications for liberal parliamentary politics that will be

examined here. Bristol was used both by contemporary politicians, among them Lord Melbourne, and by later historians including the Webbs, as a prime example of the incompetence and partisanship of unaccountable local corporations.⁶¹ Unrepresentativeness, extravagant feasting, and inefficiency were, of course, by no means unique to Bristol, and nor was local government before 1835 as universally bad as reformers painted it,⁶² but the riots of October 1831 had turned critical eyes fully upon the city. The visit of the Municipal Commissioners to Bristol in September and October 1833 elicited some activity from reformers, although the *Mercury's* recommendation to form 'a permanent committee to collect and arrange evidence with the view of facilitating the labour of the commission when it arrives', was not acted upon. Nevertheless, Daniel Burges, a leader of Bristol's freemen, later asserted that the commissioners while in Bristol 'were in constant communication with persons [i.e. Reformers] not in open court', and the Tory mayor of Bristol, Charles Payne, wrote in June 1835, that the commissioners' conclusions had been drawn 'from authority of a doubtful character and obtained in an indirect and partial manner'.⁶³ Individual reformers had clearly been active behind the scenes. With all the disagreement in Bristol over the nature and effects of local government reform in the mid-1830s, municipal activity was inextricably linked with parliamentary and national efforts. The same individuals were active in both areas and the driving force which brought many individuals into politics was the possibility of achieving realistic and desirable local goals. Activists saw municipal politics as part of the wider political confrontation. Contentious issues were at stake and unsurprisingly the Whig government and Bristol's Tory council clashed. The Bristol Liberal Association played a central part in much of this conflict, particularly since Bristol reformers had continuing grievances even after 1835. Bush shows how the revising barristers at Bristol, under pressure of time, subjected to clever manipulation by partisan churchwardens, and aware that they had been told to take account of the rateable value of properties at their discretion, approved a politically biased allocation of municipal seats to wards.⁶⁴ Bristol Conservatives also further benefited from an aldermanic system which exaggerated the slender majority they achieved following the election of November 1835, through the defection of a single Liberal councillor. In 1837 the Liberals were actually two ahead on the basis of councillors elected but the Conservatives maintained a majority by their earlier nomination of eight aldermen.⁶⁵

The Bristol Liberal Association dealt directly with the Whig government and, in an atmosphere of political rancour, subsequently

capitalized on opportunities to dominate both the magistrates' Bench and the Charities' Trustees. It lobbied for a simplification of the registration procedures, and an alteration in the unfair division of wards, by holding public meetings and petitioning in February 1836 and June 1837.⁶⁶ The selection of Bristol's magistrates became a matter of heated debate in the House of Commons in March 1836 with exchanges between Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, and Sir Richard Vyvyan. Twenty-four names were recommended to Russell as Home Secretary, by Bristol's town council, 12 Liberal, 12 Tory, but Russell had excluded six Tories from this list, most notably the stalwart Alderman Daniel. Daniel himself remained phlegmatic – 'Being a marked character . . . [I am] in no way surprised at the proceedings in the Home Office' – but other Bristol Tories felt discriminated against by the Whig government. The rejection of the magistrates followed the loss of Bristol's See in an ecclesiastical re-organization, and a threatened attack on her Select Vestries.⁶⁷ Peel and Vyvyan were unable to explain the principal of exclusion other than on the grounds of political considerations, and Vyvyan charging Russell with 'corrupt motives'; Russell, refusing to go into details, did not deny that he had been in communication with officers of the Liberal Association.⁶⁸ According to Henry Bush, writing to Vyvyan before the debate, 'the general belief is that Cunningham, deputed by the Liberal Association went to the H.O. to get as many of the Conservatives struck off as possible and that Lord John acted upon his representation'. Another Bristol Tory considered that Russell's desire to represent Bristol was the motive for his favouring 'Radical' magistrates,⁶⁹ a matter of speculation in the city for some months. The Association denied making any approach to Lord John, but it seems probable that he was asked and that he did not reject these overtures out of hand.

A further row blew up over the composition of the Bristol Charity Trustees to be appointed by the Court of Chancery in 1836. Bristol Liberals had long nursed a grievance about charitable awards being made for political reasons. For example, in 1833, of eighty names published as receiving gifts, no more than six were freemen who had voted for a reforming candidate. Of the last 45 recipients of the Peloquin gift for poor lying-in women, 35 had conservative husbands and only three liberal. The council again submitted two balanced lists of nine members apiece but the Lord Chancellor required an odd number of trustees, and when the Liberals suggested an 11:10 split in their favour, the Conservatives in pique resolved that the council would have nothing further to do with proceedings. The Liberals thus secured a disproportionate 18:3 majority of the Trustees which could be seen as revenge for their treatment at the aldermanic election. At the 1837

election the *Mercury* made much of the fact that the Charity Trustees were not Liberal. The charge that they had been guilty of corruption and undue influence at the election formed the basis of the Tory petition against Berkeley's return. The fact that fourteen members of the Liberal Association and Berkeley's election committee were also Trustees was certainly outwardly suspicious, as was the fact that the Liberal Association carried on its proceedings under the same roof. But the petition against Berkeley failed, and when the *Bristol Journal* repeated its accusations against three individual trustees, it was successfully sued for libel in 1839.⁷⁰ Overall it can be seen that municipal disagreements kept party strife at a high pitch, and that activists on both sides wanted to treat municipal affairs in the mid-1830s within a party context.

It is a point of some importance that Francis Henry Fitzhardinge Berkeley became a candidate at Bristol in the election of July 1837 under the auspices of the Bristol Liberal Association, through an application made to his elder brother Lord Segrave, Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire. Berkeley was happy to admit the connection and was full of praise for the association. His election committee was composed of the central committee of the Liberal Association with the addition of three of four individuals.⁷¹ At the previous elections in 1832 and 1835 candidates such as John Williams, a London lawyer, and John Cam Hobhouse had been selected haphazardly at the last moment, had no connections with the city, and could not provide independent finance for their campaigns. In the case of Hobhouse he never even came to Bristol in 1835, being absorbed in campaigning far more seriously at Nottingham.⁷² It was a sound tactical move by the Liberals to put up only one candidate, firstly because they could represent this action as an indication of moderation and generosity to the Tories, sharing the representation of Bristol; secondly, as it ruled out internal divisions among the reformers, and thirdly, because it effectively dished traditional Tory tactics as reasoned by Bush in July 1835: 'If the Rads bring forward two candidates we can either support the best man, or put up at the last hour a second Bristol man. By this plan the respectable whigs will not join the Rad.'⁷³ John Cunningham, President of the Association, was reported as saying that they had been attentive and assiduous for months in identifying a suitable candidate, although he qualified this by adding that the Liberal Association had no intention of dictating to electors, relecting a fear circulating in the mid-1830s that the country was in danger of becoming a victim of 'Club Government'.⁷⁴ Berkeley had an additional recommendation in that he was from a major landed family, and was thus difficult to depict as a dangerous revolutionary, unlikely to destroy the institutions of a

country in which he had a considerable stake. One can, however, treat the impression given by Cunningham of a rigorous and methodical selection process, with a degree of healthy scepticism. Lord Segrave related at a Stroud dinner in August 1837 that the Bristol Liberal Association had come to him a month earlier, asking for *Augustus Berkeley* to represent them. Only when Augustus declined did they ask for Henry; 'They did not know my brother even by sight – they took him on trust – on the character of his family.'⁷⁵ The Association's knowledge of Henry's opinions were thus less than comprehensive – he had only recently returned from America – although as it turned out his opinions and general demeanour were completely suitable, and he served successfully as Bristol's MP for the next 33 years until his death in 1870.⁷⁶ What the Association wanted therefore was *any Berkeley* in order to guarantee respectability, a local connection of sorts (the Berkeley's were historical benefactors of Bristol, although in fact had a much greater involvement in the rival town of Gloucester),⁷⁷ and financial backing. Segrave benefited considerably from Whig patronage in the 1830s, with a peerage in 1831, and the Lord-Lieutenancy of Gloucestershire in November 1835, whilst in 1841 he was created Earl Fitzhardinge.⁷⁸ Grantley Berkeley later argued in his memoirs that Segrave had made a bargain with the Whig government that if he returned four of his brothers to parliament in support of liberal opinions, instead of the existing three, he would be created an earl, and that thus his support for F.H.F. Berkeley at Bristol was part of a deal.⁷⁹ The diarist Greville alleged that a similar 'quid pro quo' had gained Segrave his Lord-Lieutenancy which he viewed as 'disgraceful', and a return to 'all the most objectionable features of the old Boroughmongering system'.⁸⁰ Certainly members of the Berkeley family were returned for West Gloucestershire, Bristol, Gloucester, and Cheltenham, and Segrave eventually got his earldom, but it is not certain that there was a clearcut connection. Grantley Berkeley was a partial witness, and his falling out with his elder brother in 1847 had added yet another scandal to the family's colourful recent history.⁸¹ Moreover, it seems that Berkeley had every intention of repaying his brother for the expenditure of £1,500 at the 1837 election.⁸² The key point that the Liberal Association had recognized was that a Berkeley guaranteed impressive financial support, so that, for example, when Joseph Parkes heard in September 1837 that there would be a scrutiny petition against Henry's return for Bristol, he remained unconcerned: 'Lord Segrave will pawn his drawers and Mrs Bunn's shift rather than lose a seat! Much to this effect he told a friend of mine last week.'⁸³

The attention which the Bristol Liberal Association gave to the registration procedure in 1835 and 1836 was the main reason that they

were able to regain their parliamentary representation in July 1837. Gains from the Courts of Revision were 349 in 1835 and 156 in 1836, mainly among household voters, significant increases given that F.H.F. Berkeley was only 56 votes ahead of the third candidate, William Fripp at the election. The Bristol Tories more or less maintained the freemen vote, and the Liberal Association had to refute charges that they wished to disfranchise freemen. Similarly, attention to the municipal register meant that the Liberals only narrowly failed to gain a majority at the first municipal elections in November 1835, despite an allocation of councillors to each ward that was weighted in favour of the Tories (which defeat, however, had serious long term consequences), and gained four seats in 1836. Henry Bush continued to be sanguine in 1835 describing the result of the registration as 'perfectly satisfactory', and estimating that the Tory majority still stood at 1,000. He admitted, however, that the Liberal Club had been active, commenting that 'there is as much excitement with our committees as if an election were going on'. Reformers had improved their position markedly among householders in Bristol's three most radical parishes, 'by the Liberal Association paying taxes to a large amount'.⁸⁴ A leader of the Bristol freemen, although presenting an encouraging impression of increasing Tory strength, admitted that 'the exertion of the Liberals has been great indeed and the number of objections they threaten us with, if established, may diminish our increase'.⁸⁵ At the first annual meeting of the association, in July 1836, the central committee reported that much had been effected for reform, particularly registration successes at a municipal and national level.⁸⁶ And Henry Bush recorded in August 1836, 'The Radical party to qualify for the municipal elections have paid their taxes much better than last year and will have the majority of our new householders.' The *Bristol Advocate* reported triumphantly, 'The battle of the constitution, said *Blackwood*, must be fought in the Registration courts, and the reformers of Bristol have fought it there – and won!!' The Association provided information to electors unsure of their voting qualifications, and publicized the conduct of individual collectors of poor rates who raised difficulties and obstructions to the payment of taxes and right to registration. Importantly, the Association organized on a ward and parish basis, with regular ward meetings, and they were now prepared to carry out the monotonous but necessary business of knocking on doors to establish the correct residence of freemen and £10 householders to cement party support. The report of the Central Committee to the second annual meeting contained copious information relating to work on the parliamentary register and acknowledged the work of parochial committees. Since municipal elections were new, and the arrangements

for parliamentary elections had been altered (by 1837 polling took place only on one day, whereas earlier in the century it could be spread out for over a week) electors had to be educated in the logistics of voting, and political associations had to organize accordingly. The *Bristol Mercury*, commenting favourably upon the work of the Bristol Liberal Association in this respect in 1836, referred to 'The admirable tact and the judicious and excellent arrangements that enabled the voters to poll precisely where they were wanted and at the right moment'. The Association also recognized the importance of engaging the support of Bristol's trade societies in support of a Liberal candidate; the last time they had been effectively mobilized as a force in Bristol politics had been the General Election of 1831 when they had almost unanimously called for reform, and yet had swung back to traditional conservatism, or a more subdued political role after 1832. After the election of Berkeley, Bristol Liberals achieved further success in the local elections of November 1837 when they gained a seat in the predominantly Tory Clifton ward. The *Mercury* saw the result as a demonstration of the 'substantial strength of the Liberals in this city, and of the ability with which they are marshalled and led'.⁸⁷ Liberals looked forward to the future; seven out of the eight aldermen who were due to retire in 1838 were Tories, and the Liberals had only to retain their ground to choose new aldermen from among their allies, and achieve a majority on the council.

A Liberal breakthrough in 1838, however, was never achieved. They actually lost two seats in the municipal elections of November, having already lost a seat in a local by-election six months earlier. Overall, the position of Liberals on the Town Council collapsed between 1838 and 1841. In February 1837 the Tory majority of 34:28 was only sustained by the fact that they had nominated all eight aldermen in 1835; by November 1841 the Tories had a majority of 51:13. The municipal elections of November 1839 were particularly disastrous with seven Liberals being displaced. Initially Liberal successes had continued early in 1838. The Association formed a committee to combat the Tory petition against Berkeley's return and successfully organized their MP's defence. They proved to be lucky in the membership of the House of Commons committee which heard the petition in that it comprised eight Whigs and Liberals to three Tories. This petition and subsequent legal actions was said to have cost William Fripp's supporters £12,000, but its defence must have cost the Liberals a lot of money as well.⁸⁸ Nor was it a problem that Berkeley was an unsatisfactory or unpopular MP. His attention to the constituency needs of Bristol erased his reputation as a 'stranger', a circumstance that had counted against previous MPs, including Romilly in 1812 and

Hobhouse in 1832. In February 1838, for example, Berkeley was thanked by a deputation of Directors of the Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, and in April 1838 he secured an appointment to Bristol's customs house. In May 1840 he moved the third reading of a Bristol and Exeter Railway Bill; in February 1841 he presented a Bill respecting the Clifton Suspension Bridge, and a month later spoke on the Severn Navigation Bill. His support for Bristol's sugar and West India interests even over-rode his personal commitment to Free Trade and the repeal of the Corn Laws, and in the key vote on the Sugar Duties in May 1841, when the Whig government was defeated by 317 to 281 votes, he spoke against the ministry, much to the disappointment of the principled *Bristol Mercury*.⁸⁹ He was to narrowly hold on to his seat at the General Election of July 1841.

One reason for the failure of the Liberals to make a break-through in 1838 lay in the fact that they were ill-served by the municipal revision of October 1838. It was alleged by the Bristol liberal press that the Tory major J.K. Haberfield robbed hundreds of their votes by tolerating, if not encouraging, delay in the revising court, because he realized that the revision would be detrimental to his party. Of 2,600 objections of various kinds only 780 were disposed of after eleven of the thirteen allotted days, and, in the end, the 1838 municipal elections were conducted on the basis of the 1837 electoral roll. But although the Liberal cause was undoubtedly hindered by this technical chicanery, it is fair to say that there were already strong hints of divisions between Bristol reformers. Nothing was heard of from the Liberal Association, for example, after March 1838 until the local elections, and there was a lament in the *Mercury* that, 'if the Liberal party hope to thrive in the city, they must help one another more than they at present do'. At a dinner for Berkeley in January 1839, the Liberal Association went unmentioned, but there was a reference to 'some dangerous and extreme principles and feelings now afloat'. In May 1839 the *Bristol Journal* reported that the Association had changed its name to the 'Registration Club', interpreting it as symptomatic of the unpopularity of the 'Liberal' tag. The *Mercury* denied the change of name but was unable to say anything more positive than that the Association was still in existence and that 'the rallying point was never more needed than now'.⁹⁰ The figures published in *Fraser's Magazine* for the parliamentary registrations of 1838, 1839, and 1840 showed Conservative gains in Bristol in each of these years, in aggregate 171 votes, which confirms the view of slackening Liberal efforts.⁹¹ It did not reflect well on the strength of the Liberal cause that July 1839 saw the formation of a Bristol Liberal Protection Society, to assist members who suffered in consequence of a conscientious party vote in imitation

of the Conservative Operatives Society. The disastrous municipal elections of 1839 reflected poor Liberal organization; the *Mercury* acknowledged 'an unfortunate departure from the mode of filling up' registration claim forms, whereby a large number of votes were lost. The remedy lay in the reorganization of the Liberal party 'so as to be entirely prepared for all future emergencies and contingencies'.⁹² This was whistling into the wind. The Liberal Association was defunct beyond this point.

Several local causes of the decline of Bristol Liberalism in the late 1830s can be identified. Significantly there was a fracturing of the alliance between Bristol's middle and working classes, and hence of unity on the 'left' of politics. Chartism in Bristol never generated mass support, although the fiery Henry Vincent expressed a determination through his speeches and newspaper, the *Western Vindicator* to 'rouse the people of Bristol from the sleep in which they had too long lain'.⁹³ Nevertheless, the endeavours of Bristol Chartists to gain support through night-time meetings on Brandon Hill, preceded by torchlight marches through the streets headed by music and banners, combined with rumours of military drilling, served to alarm Bristol's propertied classes, which was duly reported to the Home Office. The anticipated 'serious riots' did not materialize, and little came of Chartist efforts in Bristol, where – as elsewhere – they divided amongst themselves. They did, however, effect the Liberal cause both in a general and specific sense. The general atmosphere of social harmony and co-operation temporarily disappeared. For example, in December 1837 the *Bristol Mercury* had dwelt upon the virtues of Bristol's working classes, praising their adoption of educational strategies. The following month this newspaper, together with Berkeley, and leaders of the Liberal Association gave strong backing to a Bristol Improvement Society which aimed to disseminate cheap tracts outlining useful information.⁹⁴ But the *Mercury* became increasingly critical of Chartist methods and leaders in 1838–9, ending up by describing them as 'misguided men, acting under the instigation of the misguiding miscreants who live upon their victims'. The Chartists also had the power to damage the liberal cause in a more obvious sense. After a series of arrests of prominent Chartists elsewhere in the summer of 1839, in October local Chartists issued an address advising voters in the municipal elections to keep out the Whigs. Chartists claimed credit for the big liberal losses, especially in Bedminster. They also helped to muffle the liberal voice on the Corn Laws and other issues. As usual, Bristol reformers were slow in moving into action to oppose the Corn Laws. After Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, and Sheffield had all come forward, the *Mercury* lamented 'Is Bristol going to do something, anything, or nothing, with regard to the Corn Law? . . .

Where are those who ought to move in this matter?' The following week saw the hurried formation of a Bristol Anti-Corn Law Association composed predominantly of 'respectable merchants, manufacturers, tradesmen etc.'. The same month Berkeley presented a petition against the Corn Laws from 5,000 Bristol Operatives, and in April 1840 numerous Bristol petitions were presented to parliament against the Corn Laws. Bristol Chartists including William Morgan, a tin-plate worker, and Felix Simeon, a printer, however, were able to hijack Liberal anti-Corn Law meetings. For example, at one in March 1840, Chartists carried an amendment in favour of their Six Points, reflecting Corn Law repeal as 'a bribe to the working classes'. They had used a similar tactic ten months earlier, at a meeting of Bristol Liberals convened to send a loyal address to Queen Victoria on the resolution of the well-known Bedchamber crisis. Berkeley, although he declined to vote for the People's Charter, strove, fairly successfully, to steer a middle course in that his speeches showed a concern for constitutional reform, and he gained support from his identification with Corn Law repeal. At a major meeting attended by an estimated 5,000 people in Bristol in June 1841, addressed by Cobden and Bright, Cobden praised George Thomas, Berkeley's right-hand man as a pillar of the anti-Corn Law League.⁹⁵ But any analysis of the local causes of the decline of Bristol Liberalism, turns on the fact that their momentum was sustainable only while they anticipated the recapture of control of the council. Once it became clear that overthrowing the Tory majority was impractical, the Liberals accepted their status as a semi-permanent minority. The onset of apathy and a decline of party fervour, together with a disinclination to contest unpromising seats, was hardly surprising in this context. As a result, the 1840s and 1850s saw a decrease in local party rancour.⁹⁶

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Since politics after 1832 maintained its predominantly local rather than national nature, constituency party-political development was a haphazard process. There was a complex interplay between Whig-Liberal ambitions and concerns at a national level and local organizational activities. This paper has focused upon the activities of the Bristol Liberal Association in the 1830s as a case-study in constituency organization. Clearly many national themes were replicated on a local level at Bristol. In particular, the amount of energy devoted to the registration of new voters represented an accurate indication of the health of party organization and spirits. The initial complacency on the part of reformers after 1832 contrasted with the more effective Tory response to the realities of an expanded electorate.

Liberals enjoyed some success in the mid-1830s stimulated by the shock of defeat in January 1835; thereafter prospects faded away in the late 1830s amidst apathy, disagreement, and revived Conservatism. In its annual reviews of the registration battles between 1838 and 1840, *Fraser's Magazine*, a Tory periodical, could delineate a national picture of Whig decline and relentless Conservative advance, gleefully quoting from the whig *Morning Advertiser* in November 1838, 'the day is not far distant when the leaders, or those calling themselves so of the liberal party will bitterly rue their unaccountable remissness and criminal apathy'.⁹⁷ Other national features were apparent at Bristol, such as a lack of money, organization compounded by an ideological and terminological confusion as to 'Old Whigs', 'Modern Whigs', 'Liberals', 'Reformers', 'Radicals' and sundry alternative labels. Overlying these general complexities and national trends, however, were the individual characteristics and peculiarities of Bristol, including the unpopularity of Bristol's corporation, the manipulation of charitable funds, the concerns of freemen, the structure of power within the town's key institutions, the position in the West Country of the Berkeley family, and other distinctly local factors. The latter emerge, in Bristol, as elsewhere, as the major determinant in electoral realities which underpinned representation in both the reformed structures of municipal and parliamentary governance in early Victorian Britain.

Notes

¹ *Bristol Mercury*, 20 Sept. 1834.

² G. Bush, *Bristol and Its Municipal Government 1820–1851* (Bristol 1976); J. Williams, 'Bristol in the General Elections of 1818 and 1820', *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society* 87 (1968), pp. 173–201; D. Large, *Radicalism in Bristol in the Nineteenth Century* (Bristol, 1981); J. Cannon, *The Chartists in Bristol* (Bristol, 1964); P. Marshall, *Bristol and the Abolition of Slavery: The Politics of Emancipation* (Bristol, 1975); M. Harrison, *Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns 1790–1835* (Cambridge, 1988); P. Brett, 'The Liberal Middle Classes and Politics in Three Provincial Towns – Newcastle, Bristol, and York – c. 1812–1841' (University of Durham, Ph.D, 1991), Chapters 3–6.

³ J.A. Phillips, *The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs: English Electoral Behaviour 1818–1841* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 65–105. The quotation is from p. 105.

⁴ Lord Grey to Sir Herbert Taylor 11 Feb. 1831, quoted in R.W. Davis, 'The Whigs and the idea of Electoral Deference: Some further thoughts on the Great Reform Act', *Durham University Journal* (1976), p. 81. The main authorities on the 1832 Reform Act are M. Brock, *The Great Reform Act* (1973), and J. Cannon, *Parliamentary Reform, 1640–1832* (Cambridge, 1973). For good accounts of the outlook of the whig aristocracy in the 1830s cf. the introduction to A.D. Kriegel (ed.), *The Holland House Diaries 1831–1840* (1977); W. Thomas, *The Philosophic Radicals: Nine Studies in Theory and Practice 1817–1841* (Oxford, 1979), Ch. 2.

⁵ Lambton MSS (Viscount Lambton, Biddick Hall, Co. Durham) DP. 15 No. 1, Durham to Parkes, 22 Nov. 1834, DP. 15 No. 3, 22 Jan. 1835. I am grateful to Viscount Lambton for permission to use, and Miss Hester Borron and the staff of the Lambton Estate Office for facilities to use, these manuscripts.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Durham to Parkes 31 Dec. 1834, 22 Jan., 7 Feb. 1835.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Durham to Parkes 16 Nov. 1836; cf. Ellice MSS, National Library of Scotland, 15032–3, Durham to Edward Ellice, 5 April 1835, and 14 March 1837.

⁸ Grey MSS, University of Durham, Poulett Thompson to Lord Howick 13 Dec. 1834; Lambton MSS, DP. 14, No. 4, Parkes to Durham 15 Dec. 1834. For Edward Ellice (1781–1863) cf. *D.N.B.* VI, pp. 664–65. He had been married to Lord Grey's younger sister (she died in July 1832) and was M.P. for Coventry from 1818–1826 and 1830–1863.

⁹ Ellice MSS, 15044, Ellice to Parkes, 25 Dec. 1835.

¹⁰ Cf. N. Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel* (1953), pp. 325–26, 409, 425.

¹¹ Lambton MSS, DP. 14, Nos. 2 and 5, Parkes to Durham 22 Nov. 1834 and 21 July 1835.

¹² For Joseph Parkes (1796–1865), cf. *D.N.B.* XV, pp. 304–05; Gash, *op. cit.*, pp. 418–22; G. Finlayson, 'Joseph Parkes of Birmingham 1796–1865; A Study in Philosophic Radicalism', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* (1973), pp. 186–201; W. Thomas, 'Joseph Parkes and Party', Thomas, *loc. cit.*

¹³ Lambton MSS, DP. 14, Nos. 2 and 5, Parkes to Durham, 22 Nov. 1834 and 21 July 1835.

¹⁴ Quoted in J. Buckley, *Joseph Parkes of Birmingham* (1926), pp. 127–28.

¹⁵ W.M. Torrens, *Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. William 2nd Viscount Melbourne* (2 Vols, 1878), II, p. 67. I. Newbould, 'Whiggery and the Growth of Party 1830–1841: Organization and the Challenge of Reform', *Parliamentary History* (1985), p. 147.

¹⁶ Lambton MSS, DP. 14, No. 2, Parkes to Durham 24 June 1833; Parkes MSS, University College, London, Parkes to E.J. Stanley, 7 Sept. 1841.

¹⁷ Lambton MSS, DP. 14, No. 4, Parkes to Durham 18 Jan. 1835; Parkes MSS, Parkes to E.J. Stanley, 9 Oct. 1836.

¹⁸ Lambton MSS, DP. 14, No. 4, Parkes to Durham 20 Feb. 1835.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Parkes to Durham 23 Oct. 1835. For James Coppock (1798–1857), cf. *D.N.B.* IV, p. 1118; Gash, *op. cit.* pp. 423–26.

²⁰ Parkes MSS, Parkes to E.J. Stanley, Oct. 1836; (H. Rich), 'Tory and Reform Associations', *Edinburgh Review*, 62 (1835), p. 184.

²¹ Lambton MSS, Parkes to Durham, 23 Oct. 1835.

²² Parkes to Durham, 6 Sept. 1835, quoted in Buckley, *Parkes*, pp. 125–26.

²³ Lambton MSS, Parkes to Durham 5 Jan. 19 July 1836. (York's local government in fact went Tory in the late 1830s thanks in large part to financial inducements offered by George Hudson.)

²⁴ Parkes MSS, Parkes to E.J. Stanley, 9 Oct. 1836.

²⁵ Brougham MSS, University College, London, Parkes to Brougham, 2 Dec. 1837.

²⁶ Grey MSS, Russell to Howick, 16 Aug. 1837.

²⁷ Sir Robert Heron, *Notes* (2nd ed. Grantham, 1851), p. 231.

²⁸ Lambton MSS, Parkes to Ellice, 24 Aug. 1837, and to Durham, 16 Aug. 1838.

²⁹ Parkes MSS, Parkes to E.J. Stanley, 29 Dec. 1837; Stanley to Parkes, 30 Dec. 1837.

³⁰ Newbould, *op. cit.* pp. 148–49.

³¹ P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], 30/22/4A f. 279, Parkes to Russell, 7 May 1841.

³² 1832: The number of votes polled was Vyvyan 3,695, J.E. Baillie 3,160, Edward Protheroe (Jnr.) 3,028, John Williams 2,739. 1835: Philip John Miles 3,709, Vyvyan 3,313, J.E. Baillie 2,518, Sir J.C. Hobhouse 1,808.

1837: P.W.S. Miles 3,838, F.H.F. Berkeley 3,212, William Fripp 3,156.

1841: P.W.S. Miles 4,197, Berkeley 3,743, Fripp 3,689.

³³ B[ritish] P[arliamentary] P[apers], 1859 *Boundaries of Boroughs*, XXIII, p. 121; BPP. 1837 *Boundary Commissioners Report*, XXVI, p. 238.

³⁴ Brougham MSS, University College, London, W.P. Taunton to Brougham, 18 Feb. 1837; BPP. (1835), VIII, *Select Committee on Bribery at Elections*, p. 387; cf. P[arliamentary] D[ebates]. Vol. XXXIII (1836), Cols. 322–23.

³⁵ Vyvyan MSS, Cornwall Record Office, DDV/BO/61/40, R.B. Ward to Vyvyan, 2 Feb. 1833. *Bristol Mercury*, 2 Feb. 1833; for Vyvyan cf. B.T. Bradfield, 'Sir Richard Vyvyan and the Country Gentlemen 1830–34', *English Historical Review* (1968).

³⁶ T.J. Manchee, *The Origin of the Riots of Bristol and the Causes of the Subsequent Outrages* (Bristol 1832), p. 13.

³⁷ Vyvyan MSS, DDV/BO/61/SS, Bush to Vyvyan, 19 Sept. 1833, DDV/BO/61/53, 14 July 1834 and DDV/BO/02/75, 14 Aug. 1836.

³⁸ Detailed accounts of Conservative electoral organization at a national level in the 1830s are contained in R. Stewart, *The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830–1867* (1978), ch. 6 and 7; N. Gash 'The Organization of the Conservative Party 1832–46. Part II: The Electoral Organization', *Parliamentary History* (1983).

³⁹ For discussion of the technicalities of registration J.A. Thomas, 'The system of registration and the development of party organization 1832–1870', *History XXXV* (1950); and J. Prest, *Politics in the Age of Cobden* (1977).

⁴⁰ Vyvyan MSS, DDV/BO/61/53, 56, Bush to Vyvyan, 28 Oct. 1833 and 14 July 1834.

⁴¹ BPP, *Select Committee on Bribery* . . . p. 388.

⁴² *Causes and Consequences of the Return of Two Tories to Represent the City of Bristol in Parliament* (Bristol, 1835). Vyvyan MSS, DDV/BO/61/55, H. Bush to Vyvyan, 19 Sept. 1833.

⁴³ *Causes and Consequences* . . . , pp. 5–6, 14.

⁴⁴ BPP, *Select Committee on Bribery* . . . , p. 381. *Bristol Mercury*, 17 Nov. 1832.

⁴⁵ *Bristol Mercury*, 5, 12, 19, 26 Jan. 1833.

⁴⁶ A.B. Beaven, *Bristol Lists: Municipal and Miscellaneous* (Bristol 1899), pp. 1, 41.

⁴⁷ Anon, *An Account of a curious and remarkable dream which happened to a Gentleman in this city concerning Lord John Russell's dinner* (1835) in 'Broadside etc., Relating to Bristol 1836–1842 (British Library 1880 c. 12).

⁴⁸ W.D. Conybeare to W.V. Harcourt 23 March 1833, quoted in J. Morrell and A. Thackray, *Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British Association for the Advancement of Science* (Oxford, 1981), p. 115. *Bristol Mercury*, 26 Jan. 1833.

⁴⁹ *Bristol Mercury*, 21 March 1835.

⁵⁰ Place MSS, B[ritish] L[ibrary], Add. MSS. 24936, J. Ham to Place, 18 Aug. 1835.

⁵¹ *Bristol Gazette*, 5 Nov. 1835.

⁵² For biographical details of these and other leading Liberal councillors, see G. Bush, *Bristol and its Municipal Government 1820–1851* (Bristol, 1976), Appendix.

⁵³ 'A. Burgess', *Thirty Letters on the Trade of Bristol, The Causes of its decline, and the means of its revival* (1834). *Idem.*, *Letters, Essays, Tracts and other Documents, illustrative of the Municipal History of Bristol and of the Trade of its Port* (Bristol, 1836).

⁵⁴ *Bristol Advocate*, 31 Dec. 1836.

⁵⁵ *Bristol Mercury*, 11 Apr., 14 Nov. 1835.

⁵⁶ It may be an indication that Russell saw the occasion as of some significance that the printed address found its way into the private papers of Lord Holland; Holland MSS, B L., 51677 f. 184.

⁵⁷ *Bristol Gazette*, 19 Nov. 1835. *Bristol Mercury*, 14 Nov. 1835. *Bristol Journal*, 14 Nov. 1835.

⁵⁸ Vyvyan MSS, DDV/BO/62/62, 65, H. Bush to Vyvyan 29 Oct. and 19 Nov. 1835.

⁵⁹ W.S. Dowden (ed.) *The Journal of Thomas Moore IV 1831–1835* (1987), pp. 1729–30. *Bristol Mercury*, 21 Nov. 1835. *Bristol Advocate*, 22 Oct. 1836.

⁶⁰ G. Bush, *Bristol and its Municipal Government 1820–51* (Bristol, 1976). His arguments are summarized and put into context by D. Fraser, *Power and Authority in the Victorian City* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 112–16.

⁶¹ S. and B. Webb, *English Local Government . . . Manor and Borough* (1908), II, pp. 443–74.

⁶² A.T. Patterson (ed.), *A Selection from the Southampton Corporation Journals, 1815–35, and Borough Council Minutes 1835–47* (1965). M. Cook, 'The Last Days of the Unreformed Corporation of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne', *Archaeologia Aeliana* (1961), pp. 207–28.

⁶³ *Bristol Mercury*, 29 June 1833. *House of Lords Journals*, LXVII (1835) p. 407. Vyvyan MSS, 63/113, Charles Payne to Vyvyan, 8 June 1835.

⁶⁴ Bush, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–25, J. Latimer, *Annals of Bristol in the Nineteenth Century* (Bristol, 1887, 1970 ed.) pp. 208–9.

⁶⁵ *Bristol Mercury*, 6 Feb. 1836. For the system of aldermanic election, see J. Latimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–9.

⁶⁶ *Bristol Gazette*, 4 Feb. 1836, 24 June 1837.

⁶⁷ Vyvyan MSS, Daniel to Vyvyan, 63/213, 26 March 1836; 63/210, Bush to Vyvyan, 23 March 1836.

⁶⁸ *PD*. XXXII, 29 March 1836, cols. 772–92.

⁶⁹ Vyvyan MSS, 63/210, H. Bush to Vyvyan, 23 March 1836; DDV/BL/59/62, J. Osborne to Vyvyan, 22 March 1836. *Bristol Mercury*, 13 Apr. 1836.

⁷⁰ J. Latimer, *op. cit.* p. 230–36.

⁷¹ *Bristol Mercury*, 29 July 1837. 'An Elector', *An Authentic Report of the Proceedings before the Committee of the House of Commons on the Bristol Election Petition with Reasons for its Withdrawal* (1838), p. 3.

⁷² For Williams, *D.N.B.* XXI pp. 426–27, and Hobhouse, *Ibid.* IX, pp. 941–44.

⁷³ *Bristol Mercury*, 8 July 1837. Vyvyan MSS, DDV/BD/62/36, H. Bush to Vyvyan, 19 July 1835.

⁷⁴ E.g. Ellice MSS, 15044, Edward Ellice to Joseph Parkes, 1836 [n.d.].

⁷⁵ *Bristol Gazette*, 3 Aug. 1837;

⁷⁶ For Berkeley F H F, see *D.N.B.*, II, pp. 345–46; R.G.A. Mackenzie, 'The Parliamentary Representation of Bristol 1837–59 and the Political Career of Henry Berkeley', (Unpublished MA, University of Bristol, 1974).

⁷⁷ For the history and lineage of the Berkeley family, see V. Gibbs (ed.), *The Complete Peerage . . .* (1912), II, pp. 118–49. *Burke's Peerage and Baronetage* (1975 ed.), pp. 245–47.

⁷⁸ For biographical details of Baron Segrave see *D.N.B.*, II, p. 343.

⁷⁹ G. Berkeley, *Life and Recollections*, 4 vols. (London, 1865–66), II p. 370. The three brothers who were MPs were: i) Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley (1788–1867) afterwards 1st Baron Fitzhardinge, second illegitimate son of the 5th Earl of Berkeley (1745–1810) and Mary Cole, born before his parents officially acknowledged their marriage in 1796; MP for Gloucester, 1831–33, 1835–37, 1841–57; ii) Charles Grantley Fitzhardinge Berkeley (1800–1881) second legitimate son of the 5th Earl, MP for West Gloucestershire, 1832–52; iii) Craven Fitzhardinge Berkeley (1805–1855) third legitimate son of the 5th Earl, MP for Cheltenham, 1832–47, 1852–55.

⁸⁰ L. Strachey and R. Fulford, (eds.) *The Greville Memoirs 1814–1860*, 8 vols. (1938), III pp. 264–65.

⁸¹ *Burke's Peerage*, pp. 245–47. N. Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel* (1953), pp. 211–13.

⁸² *Bristol Mercury*, 29 Dec. 1837, Supplement Jan. 1838.

⁸³ Parkes MSS, Parkes to E.J. Stanley 24 Sept. 1837: Mrs Bunn was widely known to be Lord Segrave's mistress.

⁸⁴ *Bristol Gazette*, 6 July 1837. G. Bush, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁸⁵ Vyvyan MSS, Bush to Vyvyan, 62/36, 55, 57, 19 July and 26 Aug. 1835; J. Sircom to Vyvyan, 23 July 1835.

⁸⁶ *Bristol Mercury*, 25 June 1836.

⁸⁷ Vyvyan MSS, 62/75, Bush to Vyvyan, 14 Aug. 1835. *Bristol Advocate*, 12 Nov. 1836. *Bristol Gazette*, 6 July 1837. *Bristol Mercury*, 5 Nov. 1836 and 4 Nov. 1837.

⁸⁸ Beaven, *op. cit.*, p. 53. 'An Elector', *An Authentic Report . . .* J. Latimer, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

⁸⁹ *Bristol Mercury*, 10 Feb. 28 April 1838, 9 May 1840, 8, 15, 22 May 1841. *PD* LVII, 17 March 1841, col. 327.

⁹⁰ *British Mercury*, 13 Oct, 3 Nov. 1838, 12 Jan, 11 and 13 May 1839. *Bristol Journal*, 4 May 1839.

⁹¹ *Fraser's Magazine*, XVIII (1838), p. 632, XX (1839), p. 637, XXII (1840), p. 628. The net gains were respectively 56, 104, and 11.

⁹² *Bristol Mercury*, 13 July, 2 and 9 Dec. 1839.

⁹³ Cited J. Cannon, *The Chartists in Bristol* (Bristol, 1964), p. 4.

⁹⁴ PRO. Home Office, 40/47, J.K. Haberfield to Russell, 12 March 1839. *Bristol Mercury*, 16 Dec. 1837, 27 Jan. 1838, and 4 May 1839.

⁹⁵ Cannon, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10. *Bristol Mercury* 16, and 23 Feb. 1839. *Bristol Journal*, 28 March 1840. *Bristol Gazette*, 17 June 1841.

⁹⁶ G. Bush, *op. cit.*, pp. 146, 203–13.

⁹⁷ *Fraser's Magazine* XVIII (Nov. 1838), pp. 629–36 (quotation from p. 635), XX (Nov. 1839), pp. 635–46, XXII (Nov. 1840), pp. 627–35.